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Test Objective
The objective of this test was to:
• Verify whether the test turbine displays the behavior predicted in the design • Determine whether provisions relating to personnel safety are properly implemented • Characterize the dynamic behavior of the wind turbine at rated and higher wind speeds.
NREL does not limit the safety and function test to features described in the wind turbine documentation. NREL also inspects-possibly tests-and reports on features that are required by IEC 61400-2 and that might not be described in the wind turbine documentation. NREL conducted this test in accordance with Section 9.6 of the IEC standard, "Wind Turbines-Part 2: Design Requirements for Small Wind Turbines," IEC 61400-2, second edition, 2006-03.
Description of Test Turbine and Setup
The test turbine was an Entegrity EW50 wind turbine. The EW50 is a downwind, 3-blade, passive-yaw, horizontal-axis wind turbine, manufactured by Entegrity Wind Systems Inc. The blades are fixed pitch, and the turbine employs an asynchronous generator and operates at a fixed speed to deliver three-phase electric power at 60 Hz. Table 1 lists the configuration of the Entegrity EW50 that was tested at the NWTC. Figure 1 is a picture of the EW50 at the NWTC. The test turbine is located at site 1E.1 at the NWTC, which is approximately 8 km south of Boulder, Colorado. The terrain is mostly flat with short vegetation. The site has prevailing winds bearing approximately 290 degrees relative to true north. Figure 2 shows the general electrical arrangement. The wire run from the controller at the base of the tower to the point of grid connection at the data shed is approximately 100 m. The connection is made using 1/0 American Wire Gauge (AWG) wire for the three hot lines and neutral line, with a #2 AWG wire for the ground wire. The data shed houses the power instrumentation, disconnect switch, and data acquisition system. The transformer was located outside and adjacent to the data shed, which first stepped the voltage up to 480 V and then to 13.2 kV for the NREL grid. 
Instrumentation
The following parameters were measured in this test: wind speed, wind direction, electrical power, rotor speed, and grid voltage. The rotor speed was measured using a proximity sensor on the turbine generator shaft (this signal is also a controller input). An indication of turbine status was obtained by measuring the voltage of the grid and turbine brake voltage in the controller. The instruments used for these measurements are listed in Table 2 . The calibration sheets for the instruments used for this safety and function test are included in Appendix A. 
Procedure
Safety and function testing can involve some risk to personnel and to equipment. By incorporating appropriate controls into testing procedures, NREL endeavors to accomplish its tasks with minimal risk. This test report documents these controls in areas where they might have influenced the results obtained.
Control and Protection System Functions
In the list below, turbine response was observed for each major response category (startup, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown). If faults or other actions cause one of these major responses, NREL simulates the appropriate faulting action and verifies that the control and protection system appropriately sensed the condition, and provide an indication of an appropriate response. This procedure enables, for example, all the E-stop functions to be checked without exposing the turbine to multiple, potentially damaging stops. These checks are designated by the term "behavior" in the list below. 
Dynamic Behavior
NREL staff observed the turbine at all operating wind speeds to note the dynamic behavior of the turbine, including (but not limited to) vibration, yaw behavior, and noise.
Results
The results reported here are based on the test conducted from April 2009 through October 2010. The majority of controller settings were tested in October 2010.
Control and Protection System Functions
NREL limited testing to investigation of single-fault failures and has not investigated failures of "safe life" components, e.g., NREL did not investigate the tower, and considered it a "safe life" component. NREL does not make judgments on whether such failures are likely, or whether additional features in the control and protection system are needed to protect against such consequences. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the power output of the turbine system is limited. The power curve scatter plot is characteristic of a stall-regulated wind turbine, as expected. There are large negative power events shown in Figure 3 , which occur as the turbine is motoring up to an aerodynamically efficient speed in winds around cut-in. This behavior is programmed into the controller.
Power control
Rotor speed control
The EW50 is a constant-rotational-speed turbine when it is generating (see Figure 5 ). Figure 8 shows the rotor speed versus wind speed. Some hysteresis can be seen in wind speeds between 3 and 7 m/s, which is around cut-in. The scatter data reveal a second horizontal grouping at 63 rpm between 8 and 15 m/s; this value is lower than the main line, which has a slight positive slope. This secondary line occurs when the EW50 is operating in an upwind orientation.
The tip brakes are held in place with an electromagnet. The magnet holds the brake in place as the rotor is spinning. In the event of an over speed, the brakes would deploy centripetally, and slow the rotor speed before the parking brake is deployed. In the case of a grid failure, the electromagnet loses its magnetism and the brakes deploy, slowing the rotor speed before the parking brake is deployed. After the tip brakes are deployed and the parking brake stops the rotor, springs retract the tip brakes and return them to their pre-deployment position.
Yaw orientation
The EW50 is a downwind, passive yaw turbine. NREL observed yaw behavior frequently during the test period and compared yaw position with the nearby wind vane's indication of wind direction. Yaw error could be significant. Winds of greater than 6 m/s were needed to yaw the turbine into a downwind position, while the controller is programmed for a cut-in at 4.5 m/s. If the winds were perpendicular to the rotor, the winds might need to be even higher to yaw the turbine to the downwind position.
During operation, the turbine would yaw around the average wind direction. During some yaw events, the rotor was observed to yaw approximately 60 degrees in one second. In gusty winds, the turbine on many occasions turned upwind in lulls, and was trapped in the upwind position when the wind speed increased. This upwind operation can be seen in the secondary curve in Figure 4 and Figure 7 . In Figure 4 this secondary curve is most clearly visible by the maximum values (red) which are around 7 kW between 7 and 10 m/s. The average values (blue) are partially obscured in this plot, so in Figure 7 only the average power production values are plotted against wind speed for upwind operation. It is notable that in upwind operation, the power peaks between 8 and 10 m/s, above which it tends to go negative.
Spring weather at the NWTC is usually gusty, and an analysis during several months of springtime operation was performed. Results showed the EW50 operating in the upwind orientation about 3% of the time. This resulted in an approximate 5% loss of energy because the turbine consumed power during dips in gusty wind conditions in order to maintain operational rotor speed, thus lowering its power production curve.
The droop cable can over twist. There are connectors intended to decouple the droop cables, in order to prevent them from over twisting. However, because of the strain relief installation, these connectors were isolated from the twisting, and they will not decouple before the cables over twist. See Figure 18 , which shows that the cables above the strain relief are twisted, and the cables are untwisted below the strain relief; the decoupling connectors are below the strain relief. Once during the 18 months of operation the cable was untwisted by decoupling the connectors and untwisting the cables. Figure 18 shows the level of cable twist after approximately one year at the NWTC. The Entegrity 6-month inspection record lists checking for cable twist.
Startup
The controller is programmed for a 4.5-m/s cut-in wind speed. The EW50 has an anemometer on the generator to measure the wind speed. When the 10-minute average wind speed was above cut-in, the brake on the high-speed shaft (parking brake) would release, the tip-brakes would be energized (holding them in operating position), and the rotor could freewheel. When the rotor reaches a speed of 64 rpm (1800 for the generator) the generator connects to the grid. With the generator connected to the grid, the rotor spins between 62 to 65 rpm.
The EW50 also has a motor-up function. If the winds are above programmed cut-in speed (4.5 m/s) and the rotor does not reach 64 rpm, the generator connects to the grid and behaves as a motor in order to spin the rotor. Because the NWTC's air density is approximately 80% of sea level, the wind speed needs to be above 5.5 m/s for the EW50 to freewheel up to 64 rpm. The difference between the programmed cut-in and the necessary winds to operate the EW50 resulted in many motor-up events during the test period. This sequence of events can be seen in Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows that winds were greater than 4.5 m/s and the controller released the brakes and freewheeled for 10 minutes. However, the winds were not high enough for the rotor to reach an operational speed of 64 rpm. The generator motored-up the rotor, consuming just over 130 kW for approximately one second, and the rotor nearly reached operating speed. With the inertia of the spinning rotor, the rotor speed was maintained for about six minutes. After six minutes, the winds were strong enough to increase the rotor speed to operational speed and the generator connected to the grid. When the contactors connected the generator to the grid, the rotor speed was fixed between 62 and 65 rpm. When the gust that accelerated the rotor passed, the generator began consuming power to keep the rotor at operational speed. This can be seen by the slightly negative power output in the last minute of Figure 6 .
Normal shutdown
If the EW50 consumes power for 10 minutes, the controller will deploy the tip brakes. The tip brakes slow the rotor to approximately 18 rpm, which is 500 rpm for the generator. The parking brake is then deployed, which quickly brings the turbine to a stop. If the tip brakes cannot slow the turbine in 30 seconds, the parking brake is deployed. This 30-second delay between tip brakes and parking brake can be seen in Figure 12 .
This turbine has a cut-out wind speed. It will deploy its brakes if the 10-minute average wind speed is 25 m/s or more.
Emergency shutdown during operation from any operating condition
Turning the rotary switch on the controller panel to "stop" will first decrease the rotor speed, by deploying the tip brakes. Then the parking brake is deployed when the rotor slows to approximately 18 rpm (generator is at 500 rpm) or 30 seconds has elapsed since tip deployment. The parking brake is applied to the high-speed shaft, and it quickly brings the turbine to a stop. Figure 9 and Figure 12 show stops commanded by the rotary switch on the controller panel. Figure 12 shows that the parking brake was deployed after 30 seconds. This type of stop is identical to normal shutdown.
Behavior upon excessive vibration
The turbine has no means to sense excessive vibration or to shut down should excessive vibration occur. The IEC turbine design standards require such sensors on large turbines but not on turbines smaller than 200 m 2 .
Behavior upon loss of load
In the event of a grid outage, the EW50 will come to a stop in the manner described above in "Emergency shutdown during operation from any operating condition," and as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 12 .
During the test at NREL, the controller's universal power supply (UPS) failed and was put into bypass mode. In normal operation, the parking brake's solenoid is energized through the controller's UPS, and the brake pads are held off of the brake disk. Without the UPS, the parking brake deploys at the same time as the tip brakes, and the rotor comes to a sudden stop. This event is shown in Figure 10 .
Turbine-specific checks
The EW50 controller has several set points. Some of these were tested by changing the set points and witnessing the turbine behavior.
One test was on the setting for generator over speed. The normal generator over speed condition is set at 1890 rpm. The test event involved changing the generator's over speed limit to a level near operating condition, specifically 1801 rpm. The turbine started as normal, and when the generator speed reached the new over speed set point, it stopped by deploying brakes. The controller recorded the error type and time. Figure 12 shows this event. The EW50 operated as designed.
Other tests that included changed controller set points were:
• Test generator over power: Power output greater than 45 kW for 10 s, from the standard set point of 75 kW for 300 s • Test rotor speed: Rotor speed greater than 64 rpm, from 70 rpm • Test grid balance: Current difference between lines greater than 5 A, from 30 A • Test low grid frequency: Grid Frequency less than 60.2 Hz, from 59 Hz • Test high grid frequency: Grid Frequency greater than 60.2 Hz, from 61 Hz For each of these tests the EW50 operated as designed.
Personnel Safety Provisions
Safety instructions NREL received a 2008 edition of the "EW50 wind turbine user manual." The manual provided a guide to operating the controller (manufactured by Orbital A/S), turbine limit settings and wiring diagrams. Some of the Orbital wind turbine controller settings did not apply to the EW50, such as the yaw functions. The manual did not provide any safety instructions to the owner. While the Orbital wind turbine controller was extensively covered, there was no mention of the rotary stop switch on the controller's front panel, the yaw lock cable inside the tower, nor safe operating instructions. Some of the drawings referenced previous models of the EW50 design.
Entegrity does not provide an installation manual to the owner because the company's personnel install all the turbines. Foundation specifications were provided by Entegrity and NREL contracted a third party to install the foundations.
There are 6-month and 1-year maintenance checklists, and these services were scheduled to be performed by Entegrity personnel.
NREL checked the manual to determine if the safety instructions addressed requirements in the IEC small turbine design standard and found the following issues:
• There are no instructions to disengage the load and/or energy sources • There are no instructions to stop and secure the rotor. Although the Orbital controller has a "stop" command, it is not described beyond "stop turbine".
• There are no instructions to stop and secure the yaw mechanism. Although there is a yaw lock mechanism to secure the yaw, it was not documented.
Climbing
The monopole tower comes with an external ladder and safety cable to access the turbine. However, these were not installed on the turbine NREL tested, and therefore no comments can be made on ladder safety provisions.
There is an internal ladder to access the auxiliary controller cabinets. This ladder does not allow the climber to get much more than 3 m above the turbine foundation.
Standing places, platforms, and floors
There is a small, very narrow platform near the top of the tower. A person could stand on it, but would have to be tied off to the nacelle to prevent falling off. There is no railing or hand hold for this platform. There is no ladder to this platform, so the user must access this platform for an aerial lift or similar method.
Electrical and grounding system
The user manual includes single-line drawings of the electrical system and pin-outs for the controller. The installation checklist includes the line "Electrical system grounded to electrical code requirements." The heavy gauge wire (1/0 AWG) had to be routed through the panel differently than Entegrity's usual installations in order to meet code. The tower was also grounded, but this inspection task is not listed in the installation checklist that was provided to NREL. The single-line drawings show that the tower is grounded.
Fire resistance and control
The controller has a generator temperature circuit breaker and a lightning suppressor. These components are connected to the controller, and when activated they will shut down the turbine and provide an error code that can be accessed through the control panel. There is a temperature sensor in the control cabinet, but it controls a heater, which is activated when the temperature is less than -5˚C. A high-temperature reading from the cabinet temperature sensor does not lead to turbine shutdown or produce fault codes.
Fire extinguisher NREL provided a fire extinguisher in the building that housed the inverters. The manufacturer does not provide fire extinguishers or recommend that they be installed.
Emergency stop button
The turbine has a stop button on the front of the control panel, which is shown in Figure 13 .
However, if grid power is lost while the rotary switch is set to "stop", and controller power is restored, the turbine will act as if it is in "run." Turning the switch to "control power off" prevents this type of unintentional run.
Lock-out / tag-out provisions
The EW50 manual does not identify a means to re-energize and secure the turbine. NREL wrote its own procedure and followed it when performing up-tower and electrical inspections on the EW50.
Interlock on electrical cabinets
There are no interlocks on the controller enclosure.
Safety signs
1. There is a warning to "Disconnect power supply before servicing" on the lower right corner of the EW50 controller enclosure, see Figure 16 .
2. NREL added labels indicating the voltage levels on all enclosures, electrical panels, and disconnects, as well as a notice for authorized use only, see Figure 14 , Figure 15 , and Figure 16 .
Unauthorized changing of control settings
The controller settings can be changed by any user familiar with the menu system; there is no password protection on the controller. The controller is inside the tower, and the tower door has hasps that could be locked. When personnel were not accessing the controller, this door was always locked at the NWTC.
Entegrity personnel could access the controller though a remote log-on. They could change the control settings; however, it was requested that they not change the settings while the turbine was being tested at the NWTC. The settings were checked several times throughout the test to verify the setting remained the same as when the test started.
Lighting protection
The turbine has a lightning suppressor module in the control panel, and if a high-voltagepotential event occurs, the module is designed to protect the rest of the turbine and generate an error code, which can be accessed through the controller. The tower was grounded as a precaution against lightning.
During the test period, no direct or nearby lightning strikes were observed.
Presence of rotor and yaw lock
The EW50 was delivered with a yaw lock mechanism, in the form of a spring loaded pin, which inserts between bolts on the yaw ring. However the wire clamps holding the pin appear to have loosened (or never were tight enough) and the pin slowly moved into position. During this slow failure the yawing motion of the turbine bent the pin over into an inoperable position and scraped most of the bolts in the yaw ring; see Figure 17 .
Documentation
Most of the EW50 manuals that were provided to NREL were in draft form. Some of the documentation was confusing, with references to EW50, EW15, and AOC 15/50 turbine models. Many of the manuals were for Entegrity's internal use because Entegrity personnel install and maintain the fleet of EW50 turbines. In these Entegrity internal documents there were inaccuracies, such the weights of the base section of the monopole tower and the generator/gearbox assembly. What is provided to a prospective owner in the "EW50 Wind Turbine User Manual" (2008 edition) is insufficient for the safe operation of the EW50. However, the owner is not expected to interact with the turbine in a technical manner. This manual comes with the controller, and is located in a pocket inside the control panel door.
NREL checked the manuals and documentation to determine if the turbine met the documentation requirements in the IEC small turbine design standard and noted many issues. The following information was lacking in the documentation provided to NREL:
• How to properly use the front panel rotary switch • How to secure the yaw mechanism • Howe to de-energize the system • How to safely climb the tower • What to do in case of a non-auto restarting error.
Dynamic Behavior
The operation was observed by NREL personnel for at least 5 minutes at wind speeds of approximately 5 m/s, 10 m/s, 15 m/s, and 20 m/s for a total observation period of at least 1 hour.
NREL did not measure accelerations on the EW50.
The EW50 produced a significant amount of gearbox noise. When the generator was operating at synchronous speed, the turbine was relatively quiet, but it was not quiet when the generator was operating at sub-synchronous or super-synchronous speed. Significant amount of noise was produced when the brakes were deployed. The parking brake deployment slams the tip brakes back to their stow/operate position and cause a shudder through the entire turbine.
Although vibrations could be felt in the tower and sometimes seen, the vibrations were not deemed excessive.
Yaw oscillations could be severe at times, particularly in gusty winds. The rotor was seen to swing 60 degrees in approximately one second. In gusty winds, the rotor could get stuck upwind, a position, which, in winds below approximately 10 m/s, appeared almost as dynamically stable as the downwind orientation. In winds above 15 m/s the turbine rarely operated in the upwind position. 
Graphs and Plots of Turbine Responses
Exceptions to NWTC Quality Assurance System
The DAS modules were used beyond the calibration due dates. These were calibrated post-test and were found to have held their calibrations for the test period. Appendix A includes the posttest calibration sheets.
